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Small Firm Lending Contracts: 
Do Banks Differentiate Between Firms?
Marc Cowling 
Roger Sugden
This paper examines the role of interest rates and securities within the context 
of the small firm— b^ank lending relationship and questions whether banks alter 
their lending conditions on the basis of specific firm characteristics and the 
nature of the borrowing undertaken. The results suggest that the imposition of 
full collateralization reduces the role of interest rates considerably, although 
there is evidence of banks exercising their market power in more costly lending 
of the smallest of firms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The lending side of the credit market is often characterized by the 
risk-neutral bank. While it is unrealistic to assume that banks’ have perfect 
foresight with respect to “good” and bad” risk firms, it is not too absurd to 
assume that the bank has an array of potentially useful information on the 
firm a priori, that is before it determines the lending contract^ If this is 
indeed the case then there must be a number of interest rate/security 
trade-offs that leave the bank no worse off. Accepting that the presence of 
private information has a distortionary effect on the contract between bank 
and borrower (see Chan & Thakor, 1987), we use data collected in our 1991 
survey of UK small firms to examine the role of interest rates and security, 
and ask whether banks differentiate between firms on the basis of a number 
of observable characteristics.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the 
firm and loan characteristics relevant to the hypotheses set out in Section
3. In Section 3 we provide an analysis of the data and methodology used, 
and set out three testable hypotheses. In Section 4 we provide a detailed 
analysis of the results. We conclude in Section 5 with an overview of our
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results focusing on banks’ ability to differentiate between firms on the basis 
of observable characteristics. In doing so we question both the role of mar­
ket power in the relationship, the impact of collateralization on the lending 
contract, and the “distance” maintained in the relationship.
II. RELEVANT FIRM AND LOAN CHARACTERISTICS
The issue of small firm bank loans has been at the forefront of the current 
UK debate on the small firm/clearing bank relationship, after initially resur­
facing as a major issue in 1991. It has been suggested in many quarters that 
the high street banks have been imposing extortionate margins on loans to 
small firms, in effect exploiting their dominant position as the major, and 
in many cases only, supplier of small firm lending. In addition the issue of 
security on loans was identified as an important concern for small firms in 
our 1991 survey, detailed in Cowling, Samuels, and Sugden (1991); approx­
imately 22 percent of surveyed firms indicated that security was their major 
concern with existing bank practices.
However, Cowling et al. (1991) reported an average percentage over 
base of only three, with the median charge falling between two percent 
and three percent over base rates. Evidence of this nature suggests that 
this aspect of the relationship is not a major issue of contention and that 
banks are simply imposing a relatively small premium on what is, after 
all, probably their most risky area of lending. Such evidence is broadly in 
line with the results of the Bank of England-Treasury report on bank 
lending to small businesses. This recorded average margins on small firm 
loans in the 2.5 percent to 3.5 percent range. It is also consistent with 
empirical evidence from both Binks and Ennew (1993) and Keasey and 
Matson (1993).
On the issue of security our survey recorded an average ratio of around 
two times the loan value. This compares to Binks, Ennew, and Reed (1988), 
who found ratios on new loans in the 1.5-2 range, and Binks and Ennew 
(1993) who found average ratios on overdrafts of around two. What is inter­
esting to note here is that most empirical studies report high average secu­
rity ratios on small business lending. It would seem that on average loans 
are fully secured, for which we would anticipate collateralof merely one 
times the loan value plus some realization fee. It is important to question at 
this point, or at least raise the issue of, firms evaluation of assets they post 
as security when borrowing. Clearly in the event of loan default the sale 
value of an asset may be considerably less than its estimated value at the 
time the loan was authorized. If we consider that more firms default in 
recessions, when asset prices tend to be lower and demand tends to be
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slacker, then this may be reflected in substantially lower prices for assets. 
Thus for a bank the valuation of assets may be less than that reported by the 
firm. Clearly the only true ratio is the value of the asset used as security if 
and when the firm defaults on the loan. At issue here is that banks have 
reported heavy losses on lending to small businesses. If, as Cowling et al. 
(1991), Binks et al. (1988), Binks and Ennew (1993) and Keasey and Watson 
(1993) seem to suggest, the majoritj^ of loans are fully collateralized, then 
the question must be asked as to how banks actually make these huge losses. 
We are left with four possible explanations:
1. small businesses are consistendy overvaluing their assets over a con­
siderable period of time;
2. the 20 to 30 percent of unsecured loans are responsible for all the 
reported losses attributable to this sector;
3. banks are misreporting losses on small business lending; or
4. the majority of loan defaults occur at the sole trader level and losses 
reported by the banks are the cumulation of thousands of small sum 
defaults.
Evidence pertaining to the latter type of trader, which is not heavily rep­
resented in our survey, can be found in Cressy (1992). Moreover, bearing in 
mind that evidence on security ratios reported in Keasey andWatson (1993) 
was provided by banks themselves, we reject explanation (i). We accept that 
overestimation on firms’ part may occur when valuing asset cover but not 
by enough to undermine the basic arguments that the majority of loans are 
fiilly secured. To do this, firms would have to value their assets consistently 
at an average of twice their true value. This occurring at a time when house 
prices fell by only seven percent.
We now consider some of the most straightforward associations between 
interest rates and risk. Two kinds of financial market imperfections impinge 
on the small firm: information asymmetries and credit market power. In the 
real world, information is not costless, so that optimal rather than perfect 
information will be acquired. The problem in this context arises if the firm 
has more information about facts relevant to the lending contract than the 
bank. Such informational asymmetry may lead to adverse selection or 
moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs if the bank cannot distinguish 
between two types of borrower, the good risk and the bad risk, as the bad 
borrower has an incentive to pretend to be a good borrower and thus ben­
efit from more favorable lending conditions. To prevent this problem, 
banks may raise the collateral level required from the good borrower thus 
removing the incentive for the bad borrower to default. However, by doing
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SO the bank imposes an unfair cost on the good borrower. With no asymme­
tries of information, each borrower receives a contract which reflects his or 
her risk to the bank.
Moral hazard refers to situations in which a borrower’s success probabil­
ity can be influenced by effort. In cases where effort cannot be monitored 
sufficiently, the borrowers may not put in the required effort. In response 
to this banks may design a lending contract that induces more effort ft-om 
the borrower. Higher collateral requirements are consistent with this. With 
perfect information this would not be the case.
Credit market power consists in the ability to act as a price maker rather 
than a price taker. In the context of the small business/clearing bank rela­
tionship, then, large banks can influence the lending terms offered to small 
businesses. As such the small firm will have limited scope for bai^aining 
over margins or security requirements.
In the context of our survey, we are seeking to evaluate how banks deal 
with the information that they do receive about firms. For instance a num­
ber of the variables relate to size of firm directly, for example, turnover, 
employment, and others such as age of firm, legal form, loan size and sec­
tor tend to be seen as indirect proxies for firm size. (On the issue of sector, 
for instance, we would expect service firms to be generally smaller, have less 
collateral and shorter-term financing requirements. More generally we 
would expect that larger firms have stronger management teams, are more 
likely to have limited status, and have been around for longer, that is, they 
are well established in their markets.) We would thus expect that banks, 
knowing that survival rates increase with firm size (and age), would impose 
higher margins on the smallest and therefore riskiest firms.
If we consider specific characteristics of a given loan, then this can 
potentially provide a bank with a good deal of information. Certainly small 
firms have a higher propensity for short-term, principally overdraft, fiind- 
ing. Cowling et al. (1991) in fact argue that longer-term fiinding necessi­
tates stronger relationships between lender and borrower and implies a 
longer term commitment by both parties. Hence, the potential for remov­
ing information asymmetries is much greater in such a relationship. It fol­
lows that such fiinding may attract lower interest rates. IndeedCowling and 
Cressy (1993) state that “the preponderance of evidence indicates that for 
European SMEs, as well as larger firms in general, short-term finance is 
more expensive than longer-term finance.”
However, there is an issue of control aversion here. This being the ten­
dency for the owners of small firms to resist external involvement in the 
firm. As such overdraft fiinding is the most desirable form of borrowing as 
it reduces bank involvement with the firm. Firms that grow, however, tend
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to open up their capital and take advantage of external advice and involve­
ment in their businesses.
Another aspect of the loan is its intended purpose. The implications of 
what the firm is financing with its borrowing can quite clearly have a strong 
signalling effect to the lender. For instance, a firm funding investment in 
fixed assets is, in a sense, declaring its intention of being in the market for 
a considerable length of time. On the other hand a firm that is continually 
short of working capital and is constantly borrowing for this purpose may 
appear to a bank to be more risky.
A num ber of papers have argued that banking relationships in 
many European countries and also Japan are much closer due to banks’ 
devolved structure. Minns (personal communication, 1988) argues that 
“Britain has a highly centralized system which produces damaging com­
mercial and social consequences,” and further adds that “there is sub­
stantial scope for promoting local financial markets in Britain.” Petersen 
and Rajan (personal communication, 1992) argue that “the way to over­
come frictions in the small firm/bank relationship is for firms to build 
close relationships with the suppliers of capital.... Relationships are not 
just im portant for small firms. Politicians wonder aloud whether the 
strong links between banks and small firms in Germany and Japan give 
firms in these economies an unfairlylow cost of capital, enabling them 
to take along-term  perspective in their investm ents.” In our sample 
approximately 39 percent of loan decisions were made at local level, 49 
percent at regional and six percent at specialist small business branches. 
In contrast a similar but earlier study by Binks et al (1988) recorded fig­
ures of 61 percent local loan decisions, 30 percent regional and only 
two percen t at special small business branches. This suggests an 
increase in centralization of banks’ decision- making processes over the 
period. The implication of this centralization is that the lender does 
not directly observe the firm, merely responding to standard loan apph- 
cation data, supported in some cases by a variety of balance sheet fig­
ures. This raises the concept of “distance” in the relationship. On this 
note we would expect that loans m ade at the regional level would 
attract higher margins as the lender has little information on the mana­
gerial capabilities of such firms because there has been no relationship 
between the lender and the borrower. At a local level, according to 
Petersen and Rajan, a small firm can “through close and continual inter­
action... provide a lender with sufficient information about, and voice 
in, the firm s affairs so as to lower the cost and increase the availability of 
credit.”
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Turning to the issue of when a loan is taken, as economic conditions 
change we would expect interest rate margins to reflect the general business 
climate. We would expect margins to show an upward trend from 1990 to 
1991 as the UK economy slowed down and entered a recession.
The issue of collateral and bank risk has been the subject of much the­
oretical discussion. Empirical evidence is patchy on both the provision of 
collateral and the nature of it. Binks et al. (1988) found that around 30 per­
cent of firms were not required to post collateral. In Cowling et al.(1991) 
this figure had fallen to 21 percent. Evidence from the US contained in 
Berger and Udell (1990) suggests that nearly 70 percent of all commercial 
and industrial loans are made on a secured basis. If we accept that collateral 
decreases the riskiness of a given loan, see for instance Barro (1976), then 
secured loans are safer than unsecured loans. Indeed, Altman (1985) sug­
gests that use of collateral by banks is associated with observably riskier bor­
rowers. This is in line with Buck, Friedman, and Dunkleberg (1991) who 
found that posting collateral had no effect on margins, and contrasts with 
Barro (1976) who predicts that as collateral is posted margins are reduced.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The approach we adopt is to generate, using data collected from a postal 
survey, average interest rate margins and security ratios on lending to vari­
ous subsets of the small firm population in our sample. Our analysis is con­
ducted using data from a survey of 272 small businesses in both England 
and Scotland in 1991.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics relevant to the analysis. As can 
be observed service sector firms are considerably smaller (and younger) 
than both construction and manufacturing firms on all size measures listed. 
Consequently, the average loan size for this type of firm is considerably 
smaller. Interestingly, though, service sector firms had a significandy lower 
percentage of collateralized lending than the other two groups. How- 
ever,this may simply reflect the number of very small loans in this subset 
which do not merit the evaluation and posting of collateral. On this basis 
we would expect service sector firms to receive the least favorable lending 
terms, certainly with respect to bank margins. Our study, however, seeks to 
examine not only inter-group differences, but also intra-group diflierences, 
as well as examining aggregated data on specific relevant variables such as 
sales turnover, or age.
With these issues in mind and following from our discussion in Section
II, it is our intention to test three basic hypotheses;
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Table 1.
Sector Construction Manufacturing Services Total
Percent distribution 8.2 29.5 62.3 nidi
Employment 42 (23) 41 (26) 23 (10) 30 (16)
Sales Turnover 750-lm 750-lm 250-500 500-750
Age 23(18) 39 (25) 20 (10) 26(15)
Loan Size (£’000) 176 (120) 315 (65) 137 (40) 193
Percent of
Collateralized Lending
93 83 74 79
Notes: Figures in parenthesis aie median figures. Otherwise figures quoted are averages.
Hj: Market power of banks manifests itself via more costly lending 
contracts to the smallest firms.
H2: Unlimited (or full) collateral reduces potential constraints that 
small firms face when borrowing and tends to reduce the role of 
interest rates in the lending contract.
H 3: firm  size is perceived by banks to be a good proxy for riskiness
We begin from the assumption that the sample mean for our selected 
subsets provides the single best guess for an unknown population value 
“mu.” In our subsequent discussion we assume that the populations sam­
pled constitute the entire set of populations relevant to our analysis, that is, 
we use a fixed-effects model which considers only certain subsets or types 
of firm of interest to us. Using analysis of variance (ANOVA) there are two 
components of observed variability in the sample. These being variability 
within a specified group around the mean, and variability^ in group means. 
Variability between group means is measured by between-groups sum of 
squares;
*  -  -  2 
SSB = Y . N A X i - X )  
i = l  *
where the mean of the ith  group is denoted and the mean of the 
entire sample is X.
To initially test the hypothesis that the selected groups pay the same 
margins over base or security ratios, the F-statistic is calculated. However, a 
significant F-statistic leads us to suspect that the population means are 
unequal. To determine which population means are different from each
Other we use, where possible, a Duncan^) multiple comparison test. We use 
such a test rather than a simple t-test to protect against calling too many dif­
ferences significant. The Duncan test criteria are far stricter than the ^-test, 
requiring the difference between the two sample means to be much lai^er 
to be identified as a true difference. This also reduces the risk of making 
Type 1 errors in a series of ^-tests. The Duncan(/>) test is constructed as a 
multiple comparison test procedure in the manner below; for each pair (i,j)
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W
1 1
where,
p = Number of sample means 
5 = JMSE
\) = D .f. associated with MSE 
Tjj =  Observations e sample i  
TL = Observation e sample 7 
qcL{p,x>) = Critical value of range.
Duncan(/>) test is conducted at the 10 percent, five percent and one per­
cent levels of significance. Unless specified the results on margins reflect 
only those firms which posted some form of collateral on loans.
IV. RESULTS 
Firm Size and Market Power
When considering margins by loan size we can observe a steady decline 
in interest rate margins as loan size increases, see Table 2. Significant dif­
ferences were found between loans up to £500,000 and loans above this 
threshold. By measuring firms by employment once again, a downward 
trend in margins is observable as firm size increases.
Evidence of this nature tends to suggest that size is perceived as a good 
proxy for riskiness by banks. Yet given that the average security ratio 
reported was two, that is, that the average small firm loan was fully secured, 
we are left suggesting that this is rather a manifestation of banks’ market 
power. The evidence is consistent with the theory that price is related to 
market power in the sense that for lai^er firms with access to more sources 
of capital banks are competing with these other sources so price falls. For 
the smallest firms with no other options the bank becomes a virtual monop-
Table 2
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Loan Size(£’000) 0-10 11-50 51-150 151-500 > 500
Margin 3.49 3.01 2.77 2.41 1.73
Sales Turnover (£’000) 0-250 251-lm > Im
Margin 3.31 2.87 2.65
Employment 0-9 10-19 20-99 100-200
Margin 3.38 2.94 2.61 1.79
olist over lending, thus price rises. This is also apparent when sales turn­
over is used as a size measure. The evidence is consistent with Petersen and 
Rajan, who suggest that, “firms may borrow from a single lender because it 
is their only source of credit. If this is why borrowing is so concentrated for 
small firms, then concentrated borrowing should be associated with more 
expensive credit.” Hence the results offer support for H I, that is to say that 
market power of bank’s manifests itself via more costly lending to the small­
est of firms.
Collateral and Credit Constraints
Further evidence from our survey also reflects both the homogeneity 
and the differences in chaises to the various categories of firms that consti­
tute the small firm population. For instance if we consider legal form of 
business there were no significant differences on either margins or collat­
eral ratios.
This implies that unlimited or in this case full collateral eliminates 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, see for instance Chan and 
Thakor (1987). Indeed Chan and Thakor fiirther suggest that “high quality 
borrowers may put up more collateral.” Our results refute the latter conten­
tion, yet provide a degree of support for the notion that full collateral frees 
credit to firms that would otherwise find it difficult to raise external funds, 
in this case sole proprietors and partnerships. What also seems to be appar­
ent is that fully collateralized lending alters the bank’s perception of risk 
and seems to reduce the role of interest rates inthe lending contract. This 
is consistent with the concept of “distance” in the relationship; a bank has 
no need to understand a firm if it has so much collateral and therefore 
remains distant from the firm’s activities, making no real attempt to under­
stand its business, its unique characteristics, the peculiarities of its environ­
ment etc.
There appears to be no trade-oflf between interest rate margins and col­
lateral in the way outlined by Chan and Thakor. Furthermore the evidence 
tends to suggest that unlimited or full collateral eliminates any potential
Table 3
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Loan Size (£’000) 0-50 31-50 > 151
Services 3.45 2.69 2.31
Manufacturing 2.72 2.81 2.08
Other Industries 3.05 2.86 1.95
While we have already accepted the presence of market power in the 
small firm/bank relationship, there is also some evidence that size is still 
used as an indicator of riskiness. For instance manufacturing firms gener­
ally paid lower margins for a given loan than service sector firms who 
tended to be generally smaller, have less collateral and shorter-term financ­
ing requirements, and thus would appear more risky to banks. This evi­
dence does oflFer some support to H3 that size is perceived as a good proxy 
for riskiness. It is important to consider here that although the bank has 
“full” collateral, the decision to call the asset in to recoup the outstanding 
amount in the event of default is a worst case scenario, and tends to gener­
ate a disproportionate amount of adverse publicity for the bank. Thus the 
revenue generated from interest rate margins is more important to the 
bank in the short run.
The Role of Interest Rates
Turning to the role of interest rate margins more generally, we note that 
no differences were found when considered by payback period explicidy. 
The same was true for targeted use of finance, which implies excessive dis­
tance in the relationship. Interestingly there was a general upward shift in 
interest rates as the UK economy entered recession in 1990-91. In times of 
recession, as small businesses in particular become more prone to bank­
ruptcy, this area of bank lending becomes progressively riskier. Bank behav­
ior in this case is perfectly rational. This provides further support for the 
notion that collateralized lending reduces the role of interest rate margins 
in banks/small firm contracts.
V CONCLUSION
There appears to be a homogeneity of security ratios across a broad spec­
trum of small businesses. While full collateralization may eliminate or 
reduce problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, thus reducing 
credit rationing, high security levels also reduce the need for banks to 
understand the firm. Certainly, security ratios appear higher than need 
be;it seems that levels of two are a banks’ decision rule. However, this may 
reflect the non-divisibility of assets used as security. Related to the apparent
homogeneity of security ratios, there appears to be no trade-off betw^een 
security and interest-rate margins.
With respect to interest rates, larger firms with access to more sources of 
capital pay lower margins. Smaller firms with more concentrated lending 
opportunities pay higher margins. In addition small firm customers of the 
“big-four” banks pay higher margins than customers of other, smaller 
banks. This evidence is consistent with market power in the small firm/bank 
relationship.
More generally, it does appear that banks, given the nature of the rela­
tionship, tend to react to broader changes in the economic climate rather 
than changes at a regional, local or firm level.
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NOTE
1. Implicit in our analysis is the assumption that the characteristics focused upon are 
freely observable by the bank in the normal course of making its lending decisions. In 
fact a good deal of the information is contained in a standard loan application form. 
This reduces the potential role that search costs could play in relation to the 
determination of the lending contract.
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